European states and the EU are supporting national rearmament and military modernisation plans. This has increased funding for dual-use by design research, where civilian and military applications are considered from the outset (p. 2).
The traditional distinction between civilian and military research in Europe
Historically, Europe maintained separate ecosystems for civilian and military research. EU funding programmes clearly distinguish between civilian and military research, exemplified by Horizon Europe for the 2021–27 (p. 2) period, under which only research focused on civil applications is eligible. Military research is funded by the European Defence Fund, established in 2017 (p. 2). Many German universities adopted civil clauses to ensure research is for peaceful purposes. Export controls and research security policies complement these measures to safeguard against proliferation and misuse risks (p. 3).
Policy incentives for dual-use by design research
Recent policy initiatives aim to incentivise dual-use by design research to strengthen economic security and drive technological innovation, influenced by lessons from Ukraine’s military innovation processes. This approach features in the 2025 (p. 3) European Preparedness Union Strategy. Concurrently, a Bavarian court case concluded in March 2026 (p. 3) that the state could prohibit civil clauses, prompting some research organisations to reconsider them.
Increased funding for dual-use by design research
Civilian research funding mechanisms are adapting. A December 2025 (p. 4) EU regulation (Regulation 2025/2653 (p. 4)) modified the European Innovation Council Accelerator to remove investment barriers for dual-use start-ups. The Digital Europe Programme, established in 2021 (p. 4), now stresses support for dual-use actions. Furthermore, the proposed Horizon Europe for the 2028–34 (p. 4) period suggests broadening its scope to support dual-use actions. Military funding streams like the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, operational since 2023 (p. 4), have also been created.
New proliferation, diversion and misuse risks
Growing dual-use by design research could increase the risk of sensitive technologies falling into unintended hands or being used to violate human rights. Research areas posing misuse concerns include technologies integratable into military systems, such as facial recognition and AI-enabled computer vision capabilities (p. 5).
Five challenges for export controls stemming from dual-use by design research
Current developments pose five (p. 5) export control challenges. The primary challenge involves distinguishing the multiple meanings of ‘dual-use’. Secondly, interpreting export control exemptions for ‘basic scientific research’ is complex, as research at technology readiness levels 1 (p. 6) and 2 (p. 6) may already consider military uses. Additional challenges include engaging diverse new actors, creating stronger links between export control authorities and funding agencies, and coordinating export controls with research security policies (p. 7).
A broader and more integrated governance framework is needed
Export controls are only one measure of an effective governance framework. A robust framework requires stronger coordination between export controls and research security policies. It must link policies addressing risks with those encouraging dual-use by design research, and requires the active involvement of research organisations to strengthen internal due diligence processes (p. 7).
