Redefining 'responsible exit' in the context of the crime of aggression: Lessons from corporate responses to Russia’s war against Ukraine
This report establishes a framework for responsible corporate exit during wars of aggression, focusing on Russia. It outlines five pillars: immediate harm reduction, avoiding complicity in crimes, conducting heightened human rights due diligence, preventing value transfer, and providing remedy. Case studies include Société Générale, Unilever, and Raiffeisen Bank International.
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OVERVIEW
Introduction
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered an unprecedented wave of corporate announcements regarding the suspension, withdrawal, or continuation of operations in Russia. However, several years into the conflict, there remains no widely accepted framework for what constitutes a responsible corporate exit during a war of aggression. This report, produced by B4Ukraine in collaboration with the Business and Human Rights Centre, the University of Essex, the Kyiv School of Economics, and the Investor Alliance for Human Rights, addresses this gap by proposing a rights-based framework grounded in international human rights standards and corporate practice since 2022.
Concept and definitions of ‘responsible exit’
A responsible exit is defined as an outcome of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights as set out in the UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs). It is a managed process that mitigates adverse impacts associated with the exit itself. Research suggests that a responsible exit must be time-bound and rights-based, prioritising immediate harm reduction and avoiding contributions to international crimes. It requires proactive planning, adherence to labour rights, and clear communication with stakeholders such as employees and local communities. A central challenge involves navigating trade-offs, such as balancing the risk of economic disruption for workers against the risk of sustaining an unlawful war through continued presence.
Steps, events, and mechanisms preceding an exit
The first step in a responsible exit is a thorough assessment of how operations intersect with the conflict through heightened human rights due diligence (hHRDD). This includes identifying whether tax payments, products, or services support military activities or the aggressor state’s capacity to wage war. Various triggers can precipitate an exit decision, including international sanctions, host-country legislation—such as Russian laws requiring businesses to assist with mobilisation—and reputational pressure from civil society. A clear exit strategy should specify the timeline and mode of disengagement, whether through suspension, wind-down, or full divestment. It must also include mitigation measures for affected parties, such as severance pay or relocation support, and a plan for asset disposition that prevents value transfer to abusive actors.
Responsible exit redefined
The report proposes a redefined framework for responsible exit consisting of five key pillars. First, immediate harm reduction involves the rapid cessation of activities that sustain, enable, or normalise the continuation of conflict. In this context, ‘relevant stakeholders’ are expanded to include civilians harmed by the war beyond a company’s immediate operational footprint. Analysts estimate that foreign companies remaining in Russia have paid approximately $60 billion in taxes since the invasion, including $20 billion in 2024 alone, which materially supports the state’s fiscal capacity to sustain the war.
Second, firms must avoid causing or contributing to international crimes. This requires acknowledging that ordinary commercial operations, such as tax payments and maintaining supply chains, can amount to a knowing contribution to a state’s capacity for abuse. Third, the process must be grounded in hHRDD, treating the aggressive war as the primary lens for risk and conducting continuous reassessments as the conflict evolves. Fourth, companies must prevent the transfer of value or capability to actors likely to commit abuses. This “capability extraction” involves withdrawing software licences, proprietary tooling, and intellectual property to ensure the state cannot inherit a functioning business. Finally, companies should provide remedy and support for affected workers, ensuring their safety and financial well-being without using these obligations to justify indefinite delays in exiting.
Case studies
The report examines three distinct corporate trajectories. Société Générale provides an “early exit” benchmark, completing its withdrawal within three months of the invasion and reporting a net loss of approximately €3.2bn. This quick action effectively reduced future tax contributions and financial support for the Russian economy. Conversely, Unilever followed a delayed exit path, maintaining local production for over two years. This prolonged presence led to its designation as an “international sponsor of war” by Ukrainian authorities and eventually required selling its assets at a significant discount mandated by the Kremlin in October 2024.
Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI) serves as an example of irresponsible non-exit. As the largest Western financial institution still active in Russia, it has generated over €6 billion since the invasion began. RBI paid $491 million in taxes in 2023 alone, making it the largest foreign corporate taxpayer in the dataset. The report argues that by continuing to facilitate cross-border trade and provide financial services to companies linked to defence supply chains, RBI has failed to meet the minimum expectations of responsible disengagement.