Summary

The re-election of Donald Trump in November 2024 has materially altered the regulatory environment for US LNG export infrastructure. Executive orders issued in January 2025 rescinded the previous administration’s permitting pause and established accelerated approval pathways for new liquefaction terminals along the Gulf Coast. If fully constructed, these projects would represent a significant addition to global LNG export capacity, locking in fossil fuel infrastructure with operational lifespans extending well beyond 2050, which is inconsistent with 1.5°C-aligned decarbonisation pathways.

Lifecycle greenhouse gas assessments increasingly indicate that US LNG carries a carbon intensity comparable to or exceeding that of coal-fired power generation under short-term global warming potential metrics. This research maps and quantifies the scale of identified credit and investment flows, particularly ING Group’s dominant creditor position and Allianz’s concentrated investment holdings. These findings represent a material misalignment between climate change mitigation requirements and actual capital allocation to new fossil fuel infrastructure.

Introduction

The election of Donald Trump for a second presidential term in November 2024 reshaped the outlook for US fossil fuel expansion. Within days of taking office in January 2025, he lifted the pause on new LNG export terminal permits and signed executive orders to accelerate approvals. This push frames US gas exports as an economic and geopolitical tool, pressuring European allies to purchase American LNG as a condition for favourable trade relations.

The Netherlands functions as a primary LNG import hub for Northwest Europe, receiving cargoes via the Gate terminal in Rotterdam and the EemsEnergy Terminal in Eemshaven. Dutch banks, pension funds, and insurers maintain significant financial relationships with the US oil and gas companies that drive this growth. This research creates an evidence base to hold Dutch financial institutions accountable for their role in the US LNG buildout.

Research methodology

The primary objective of this research was to identify and quantify the financial relationships, including loans, underwriting services, and investments, between Dutch financial institutions and companies active in the LNG value chain from the US to the Netherlands. The scope covers 28 banks, pension funds, and insurance companies operating in the Netherlands. For insurers and pension funds, information was retrieved from financial databases and their own public disclosures.

A beta regression model was developed to estimate individual bank contributions to syndicated loans and underwriting services. The study identifies 32 company groups active across the supply chain, spanning export facility ownership, LNG trading, import terminal operations, and commodity trading. Historical trade data from January 2016 to February 2026 was used to establish the connection between US exports and Dutch importers.

US LNG exports to the Netherlands

Between May 2017 and the end of 2025, the Netherlands received 39 million tonnes of US LNG across 619 shipments. Import volumes rose sharply following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Cheniere Energy accounted for approximately half of cumulative import volumes, totalling 19 million tonnes across 306 shipments. Other major exporters identified include Venture Global, Shell, and Osaka Gas.

The Rotterdam Gate terminal and EemsEnergy terminal in Eemshaven are the two primary LNG import facilities in the Netherlands. The Gate terminal, owned by Gasunie and Vopak, was the largest recipient of US LNG cargoes, receiving more than 28 million tonnes between May 2017 and February 2026. Long-term contracts have been signed by companies including Uniper, OMV, TotalEnergies, Shell, PetroChina, BP, and Glencore to receive or regasify gas at these terminals.

Dutch financing of LNG supply chain from US to the Netherlands

Dutch banks collectively extended USD 58.8 billion in loans and debt underwriting to companies in the supply chain between 2017 and 2025. ING Group was the dominant provider at 63% (approximately USD 37 billion), followed by Rabobank at 25% (USD 15 billion) and ABN Amro at 12% (USD 7 billion). ING’s financing peaked in 2023, driven by a large facility extended to commodity trader Trafigura. Conversely, ABN Amro’s financing declined significantly over the study period.

As of April 2026, institutional investors held a combined USD 9.9 billion in listed equity and fixed income instruments issued by LNG supply chain companies. Insurance companies represented the largest share at 68% (USD 6.8 billion), led by Allianz, which was the single largest holder at USD 6.6 billion. Allianz’s holdings represented 67% of the total identified institutional investment. Pension funds held USD 2.6 billion (26%), with ABP and PMT being the largest contributors in this category.

A baseline-versus-actuals analysis for 2018 to April 2026 indicates net divestment by major players: ABP reduced exposure by USD 3.4 billion, Allianz by USD 3.3 billion, and PfZW by USD 1.0 billion. However, when isolating holdings in LNG export facility owners, Allianz showed a net increase of USD 109 million against the baseline. This contrasts with reductions by ABP and PfZW, raising questions about the consistency of Allianz’s climate commitments at the asset-class level.