Introduction

The report reviews how mining reforms since 2008 have shaped state performance in governing the 3T (tin, tantalum, tungsten) artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector in North-Kivu, South-Kivu and Tanganyika. Reforms aimed to reduce conflict financing, improve transparency, formalise production, and address gender inequality. Evidence shows mixed outcomes, with improvements in some governance functions but persistent weaknesses linked to historical institutional fragility and ongoing armed interference.

Methodology

The review synthesises 99 academic and policy sources in French and English. A snowball method was used due to limited literature focusing solely on state performance. Seven recurring governance challenges were identified: restricted access and militarisation, poor site demarcation, disorganisation of diggers, lack of trading transparency, taxation issues, weak accountability, and exclusion of women.

The 3T mining sector before the reforms

Across all provinces, mining governance was characterised by informal extraction, widespread smuggling, weak administrative oversight, and strong influence of armed actors.
Hybrid governance—shared between state, customary authorities, armed groups and traders—shaped access, taxation and dispute resolution.
Women formed about 20% of the ASM workforce but were concentrated in low-paid roles, excluded from pit work, and under-represented in decision-making.

The situation in Tanganyika Province

Mining was historically industrial (e.g., Géomines, Zaire-Etain), shifting to ASM after 1996. Prior to reforms, state agents were largely absent, cooperatives did not exist, and creuseurs (diggers) were managed by customary authorities. Smuggling to the Kivus was common, and both army units and rebels taxed mining activity.

The situation in South-Kivu Province

A long mining history (e.g., MGL, Sominki) influenced political–economic structures. Liberalisation in 1982 increased informal mining and smuggling. State actors often levied illegal taxes, while armed groups controlled major sites. Before reforms, mining communities faced insecurity, predation and poor state service delivery.

The situation in North-Kivu Province

Sominki’s collapse and the growth of ASM in conflict zones enabled armed control of major sites such as Bisie. Up to 43% of 3T production was unrecorded, with extensive smuggling and informal taxation. Customary chiefs regulated access and extracted payments.

Women and mining: An overview

Women participated widely in low-paid activities such as washing, crushing and sorting. They earned substantially less than men (e.g., USD 40–120 per month vs. men’s USD 187–337). Cultural beliefs restricted them from pits, and many lacked legal recognition and access to licences, heightening exposure to extortion and gender-based violence. Legal frameworks offered little specific protection.

Addressing the governance challenges in the mining sector: Post-Reform changes and limitations in state performance

Access and militarisation of mining sites

State presence increased where iTSCi or BSP traceability systems were active. In Tanganyika, security improved notably, with fewer armed groups evidenced. However, in the Kivus, armed interference remained widespread—South-Kivu recorded the highest interference (28% of sites). At some sites, state agents continued extortion or illicit tag sales, undermining reform intent.

Demarcation of mining sites

AEZs were established under the mining code, but many (62% in South-Kivu) overlapped with industrial concessions, reflecting poor coordination. Some demarcations caused disputes between cooperatives. Despite recent progress—such as new AEZs in Walikale—site mapping remains inconsistent.

Organising diggers

Cooperatives expanded significantly but often became vehicles for elite capture. Many did not follow cooperative principles, provided limited technical support, and restricted miners’ bargaining power. Cases in Masisi, Kalimbi and Tanganyika show tensions between cooperatives and communities, with monopsony conditions in some areas (e.g., MMR/CDMC).

Transparency in trading minerals

Traceability improved oversight in regulated areas, enabling more reliable production statistics. However, smuggling persisted, including leakage from “closed-pipe” systems. In conflict-affected zones, state agents’ limited access and the illicit sale of tags compromised supply-chain integrity.

Taxation on mining

Formalisation increased official tax collection, but illegal levies continued. In Tanganyika, MMR reported paying USD 2.8 million in 2012, but customary taxes and unofficial payments persisted. In the Kivus, up to 19 different authorities taxed miners at non-iTSCi sites, indicating fragmented governance. Basket Fund revenues rarely benefited communities and were associated with mismanagement.

Accountability towards mining communities

Despite increased revenue, redistribution to communities was minimal. Development projects were limited, and reforms did not significantly improve miners’ living standards. In some cases, new governance layers expanded opportunities for corruption.

Has women’s situation changed?

Formalisation did not meaningfully address gender inequality. Women remained excluded from pits, under-represented in cooperatives, and often omitted from official registries. Some positive developments include reduced armed interference in certain sites and the emergence of women’s associations such as RENAFEM, though impacts remain limited.

Concluding remarks

Reforms delivered partial improvements—such as increased state presence, better traceability, and expanded cooperatives—but did not establish a coherent governance model. Persistent armed interference, weak accountability, elite capture, and the marginalisation of women continue to constrain sector governance and limit developmental impact.