Reining in big tech corporations: Why platform governance requires structural regulation
This paper argues that big tech platform corporations function as state-empowered artificial legal entities rather than private contractual arrangements. Highlighting their structural and governance power, the author suggests that these organisations require structural regulation and democratic oversight to recalibrate the delegated powers granted by states.
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OVERVIEW
Introduction
Big tech corporations control AI systems, driving wealth and power for an elite class. Rather than states controlling big tech platform corporations (BTPCs), BTPCs increasingly influence states. Through incorporation, BTPCs receive perpetual existence and capital lock-in, accumulating and organising capital. They can transform from vehicles for capital accumulation into engines of capital constitution, shaping conditions where economic activity becomes capitalisable.
1 Why understanding corporations matters
Corporations possess state-like attributes and are not passive nexuses of contracts. Governance architecture mandates directors act in the corporation’s interests. BTPCs actively influence governments for favourable regulations. Where BTPCs run essential digital infrastructure, they set rules shaping market participation. Wealth inequality flows from corporate wealth, as states advantage corporations with unique attributes.
2 Legal personhood
Treating corporations as legal persons lets them contract like natural persons. The modern corporation is an artificial legal entity whose personhood is bestowed by the state. This personhood determines the separation of corporate capital from shareholders, providing complete entity shielding and facilitating long-term value growth.
3 Entity partitioning
Capital lock-in and entity shielding secure corporate property. Complete entity shielding, facilitated by separating foundation capital from investing shareholders, means non-firm creditors cannot claim the firm’s assets. This protection stems directly from the state-created artificial legal person.
4 The English East India Company and the Gilded Age Corporations
By 1657, the English East India Company combined the contractual joint stock company with artificial legal personhood, creating permanent capital. Between 1657 and 1691, proprietors received dividends of 840% (14) on original investments. Later, the company would collect over £20 million (14), generating a surplus of £4 million (14). By 1890, three-quarters (15) of United States wealth was controlled by corporations. These entities controlled key infrastructure before states structurally regulated them.
5 Big tech platform corporations
BTPCs operate simultaneously as market participants, infrastructure providers, and rule organisers. They derive durable advantage from organising environments where economic value grows. Addressing BTPC dominance requires institutional redesign and democratic reassertion rather than solely relying on privacy or antitrust laws.
6 The significance of the nature of the modern corporation to big tech platform corporations
The modern business corporation is an active entity with perpetual capital lock-in. BTPCs demonstrate the corporate form’s potential to cross frontiers, functioning as capital-constituting corporations that determine capital’s very nature.
7 Conclusion
BTPCs operate as semi-sovereign governance machines. To recalibrate delegated authority, platform governance requires structural regulation. This could mean making corporate privileges conditional on public-law-style governance obligations or granting governance rights to users. Re-visioning the corporation is essential, as the top one per cent (19) of global wealth holders own nearly 40 per cent (19) of all personal wealth, while the bottom half owns only two per cent (19). AI also threatens employment; in February 2026, the Block founder cut 4,000 (20) of the 10,000-person (20) workforce. Regulatory intervention must target structural privileges, not isolated conduct.