Bottom line up front

Africa is experiencing a surge in online disinformation campaigns designed to persuade the public that authoritarian rule and foreign mercenaries are essential for stability. These tactics, pioneered by the Wagner Group (now rebranded as Africa Corps) in the late 2010s, are part of a resource-for-protection business model. Current pro-Russian influence campaigns are evolving through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools and are being increasingly adopted by local African actors. To address this, digital platforms must be held accountable for enforcing policies against paramilitary propaganda, and African stakeholders require more support to expose anti-democratic operations and improve digital literacy.

Introduction

The current global surge in armed conflict is driven by complex factors, including great power rivalry, eroding multilateralism, and the proliferation of weapons via the internet and a diffuse global economy. Nations are increasingly shifting towards “light footprint warfare”, which utilises drone strikes and special forces to circumvent traditional legal architectures. This environment has empowered mercenaries, with the global market for the private military and security industry valued at US$224 billion in 2020 and projected to grow to US$457 billion by 2030. This figure could eventually exceed the military spending of most nations except China and the United States. While private military and security companies (PMSCs) are technically registered businesses, the line between them and mercenary groups is blurring as they increasingly act as proxies for state interests.

Strongmen seek out their own private armies

Africa is currently home to at least 50 armed conflicts, representing roughly 40 percent of the global total. Disillusionment with democracy is rising because expectations for improvements in living standards and security have not been met for many citizens. By 2030, approximately 26 percent of Africans are projected to live on less than US$2.15 per day. Climate change is expected to exacerbate these issues, rendering large areas unfit for agriculture and pushing millions more into poverty. This instability creates a vacuum that militant extremist groups and military juntas exploit. Coup leaders often use the resource-for-protection model to manufacture consent and prolong their rule, frequently employing Russian-linked mercenaries to provide security in exchange for natural resource rights.

Wagner Group’s pioneering methods go viral

Russia’s “regime survival package” offers embattled governments the services of “political technologists” to enhance their image. These operations use data analytics and hyper-targeted social media content, often disseminated through a “franchising” strategy where the Kremlin funds local residents and influencers to spread pro-Russian narratives. This approach makes the content appear more genuine and harder for platforms to detect. For example, in Mali and Burkina Faso, public approval of Russian leadership jumped significantly between 2019 and 2023, reaching 89 percent and 81 percent respectively. These campaigns often feature doctored or repurposed imagery to glorify mercenary operations or falsely blame Western nations for civilian casualties. In Burkina Faso, Facebook content mentioning the Wagner Group jumped 1,900 percent over a four-month span in 2021 compared to the previous two years.

Risks looming on the horizon

The demand for critical minerals, such as cobalt and lithium, is likely to increase the role of private security actors in fragile areas. Simultaneously, internet access in Africa is projected to reach 75 percent of the population by 2030, up from just 20 percent in 2020. This expanded connectivity, combined with generative AI, allows for the creation of sophisticated deepfakes and synthetic news at an unprecedented scale. To counter this, researchers suggest “prebunking” or “inoculation” strategies, where audiences are taught to recognise and refute misleading claims before they are targeted by digital propaganda.

Recommendations

The report recommends that lawmakers and civil society groups pressure digital platforms to enforce existing policies that ban paramilitary propaganda. This includes reporting harmful content and holding tech companies accountable for failing to follow their own commitments. Additionally, stakeholders across Africa should be supported in exposing influence operations and enhancing digital literacy. Counter-messaging should focus on highlighting the self-interest of mercenaries and their indiscriminate use of violence. International organisations like UNESCO and the United Nations should assist local press and democratic institutions in dissecting these propaganda structures to protect information integrity.