Introduction

Corrupt actors rely on private-sector intermediaries to move and conceal stolen wealth, set up offshore structures, disguise ownership, and gain access to the international financial system. Professionals in the financial and non-financial sectors play a crucial role in facilitating these schemes, sometimes intentionally and other times by having their services misused. Historically, professionals in the non-financial sector, such as accountants, lawyers, and real estate agents, have largely escaped scrutiny by law enforcement and regulators compared to their counterparts in the financial sector.

To better understand this role, Transparency International compiled a database of 78 cases of corruption and offshore wealth concealment linked to illicit financial flows out of Africa. This research maps the roles played by 103 enablers across 146 enabler-case observations. The paper gathers evidence on accountability measures taken to identify enforcement patterns and improve the understanding of barriers to holding these professionals to account.

Avenues for accountability

Enablers can be held to account through criminal proceedings or administrative enforcement by supervisory bodies. All 37 jurisdictions covered in the analysis have criminalised money laundering, allowing authorities to bring charges when enablers facilitate the laundering of corruption proceeds. Eleven jurisdictions also allow for criminal charges for failures to implement preventative measures, such as customer due diligence or identifying beneficial owners. Furthermore, 21 jurisdictions have introduced specific criminal offences for failing to submit a suspicious transaction report.

Administrative accountability is available where relevant professions are subject to anti-money laundering (AML) obligations and a supervisory body has the authority to enforce them. Supervisory sanctions typically include suspending or revoking licences, issuing administrative fines, or publicly reprimanding an enabler. However, regulatory gaps persist; for instance, Lebanon, Niue, Switzerland, and the United States still do not have comprehensive AML obligations for all relevant professional groups identified in the study.

Accountability measures taken against the enablers

The findings indicate a substantial accountability gap, with no evidence of action taken in the vast majority of cases. Accountability measures could be identified for only 19 of the 103 enablers (18.4%) captured in the dataset. Across the 146 enabler-case observations, no public evidence of accountability action was found in three-quarters of them. Enforcement action was most likely where enablers had been exposed through major journalistic leak investigations, suggesting that accountability remains reactive rather than systematic.

Criminal accountability was particularly rare, with successful outcomes in only three instances (2% of observations). These successful cases occurred in Jersey and the United Kingdom. In three-quarters of observations where criminal measures were identified, charges were later dismissed or investigations discontinued. This illustrates the difficulties in meeting evidential thresholds, especially where authorities must prove both the criminal origin of assets and the enabler’s knowledge. Lessons from dismissed cases include shortcomings in training, limited financial resources for law enforcement, and judicial obstruction in certain jurisdictions.

On the supervisory side, action was identified in only 16 of the 67 observations where AML obligations were in place at the time of service. Fines and warnings were the most common measures, while licence revocations were uncommon. The identified fines were often modest, with a median value of US$235,700, raising questions about whether they are sufficiently dissuasive. Additionally, government agencies were found to publish more data on enforcement actions than self-regulatory bodies, though the latter provide more information on their supervised populations.

Takeaways and way forward

The evidence suggests that enforcement agencies and supervisors often lack the capacity, capability, or will to monitor and sanction enabler behaviour proactively. Enforcement actions frequently follow the publication of large journalistic investigations rather than routine supervision. To address these gaps, criminal justice actors should pay systematic attention to the role of enablers during corruption investigations and build stronger cases by examining financial patterns and repeat enabling behaviours.

Governments must ensure that all professional sectors presenting money laundering risks are subject to comprehensive AML obligations and operational supervision. Supervisors should be better equipped with the mandate and resources to proactively identify and sanction enablers. There is also a critical need for increased transparency; AML supervisors should publish comprehensive data on enforcement actions taken, including the names of sanctioned professionals and details of their wrongdoing, to serve as a deterrent and a learning tool for the wider sector.