Power tussle: Hedge fund activists and short sellers
This research analyses the interaction between activist hedge funds and large short sellers in Europe. It demonstrates that public disclosures of significant short positions increase the likelihood of activist targeting and campaign success. The findings highlight an information channel where short-seller signals help activists identify underperforming firms with value-creation potential.
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OVERVIEW
Introduction
This research investigates the interactions between activist hedge funds and large short sellers in European markets. While activist hedge funds typically seek to increase firm value through “voice” or intervention, short sellers hold counter views, believing firms are overvalued. Despite these differing perspectives, both groups often target the same underperforming firms. The study addresses how these sophisticated investors react to one another’s presence, how their investment decisions change, and how their profitability is affected. The central hypothesis is that information channels are critical, as mandatory disclosures of large short positions transmit valuable signals to activists regarding firm underperformance and potential value improvement.
Data
The study utilizes a sample of 684 activist campaigns in Europe between January 2010 and December 2019, involving 276 unique hedge funds. This dataset is merged with hand-collected disclosure data on 15,123 firm-quarters with large short positions, involving 1,932 unique stocks from 28 European Union (EU) member states and two observers. Aggregate short-selling activity is measured using “On Loan” data provided by S&P Securities Finance. Additional data sources include Compustat Global for financial accounting, Thomson Eikon for institutional ownership, BoardEx for executive compensation, and the SDC database for merger and acquisition information.
Descriptive statistics
The 684 activist campaigns are concentrated in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, which together account for 65% of the total. Approximately 59% of these campaigns are launched by foreign hedge funds, with 24.7% originating from the United States. The overall campaign success rate is approximately 60.7%, meaning activists achieved at least one stated goal. In terms of short selling, the average large short position represents 1.9% of shares outstanding. Companies targeted by activists are found to have significantly higher aggregate short interest and are more likely to be held by multiple large short sellers compared to matched non-target firms.
Short-selling disclosures and hedge fund activism
The research finds that the presence of large short sellers is positively associated with a 21% higher likelihood of activist targeting. To establish causality, the authors exploit the 2012 EU harmonisation of short-sale disclosure rules as an exogenous shock. Following this regulatory change, firms newly subject to disclosure requirements experienced a relative increase in activist targeting. Conversely, activism significantly affects short sellers; stocks targeted by activists have an almost 60% higher marginal probability of seeing a decrease in large short positions. This suggests that the risk of a short squeeze outweighs any potential increase in shorting opportunities following an activist’s entry.
Short positions and activists’ profitability
Activists earn substantially higher abnormal profits in campaigns involving large short positions. A calendar-time portfolio buying target stocks with large short sellers in the previous quarter earned a value-weighted abnormal return of 12.1% per year. In contrast, target stocks without large short positions generated an annualized return of only 3.9%. Furthermore, the involvement of large short sellers is positively associated with the probability of activist success, which increases by 16.6 percentage points (a 27% increase over the unconditional success rate) when a large short seller is present. This success is particularly sensitive to the support of institutional shareholders and blockholders.
Why are activists attracted to firms with large short sellers?
The authors identify three primary channels. The information channel is the strongest; only hedge fund short sellers predict activist targeting, as their trades convey corporate-event signals. This effect is amplified by information aggregation (multiple short sellers) and novelty (first-time disclosures). Under the bargaining channel, short-selling pressure weakens management’s position, leading activists to use less hostile tactics, such as fewer board-seat demands (down 20.6 percentage points) and fewer proxy contests (down 12.3 percentage points). Campaigns are also 29% shorter in the presence of short sellers. Finally, the cost channel suggests that short-seller-induced price declines allow activists to accumulate shares at more favourable prices over longer accumulation horizons.
Conclusion
Public short-position disclosures serve as a valuable screening signal for activist hedge funds, influencing their targeting decisions and enhancing their profitability and success rates. While the information channel appears most dominant in the European context, the bargaining channel also plays a significant role in reducing campaign hostility and duration. These findings indicate that the transparency mandated by EU short-selling regulations has significant consequences for corporate governance and the strategic interactions between different classes of sophisticated investors.