Introduction

European countries are increasingly incorporating carbon dioxide removal (CDR) into their climate strategies. While the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change acknowledges CDR as a supplement to counterbalance genuinely hard-to-abate residual emissions, it is not a substitute for deep, rapid, and sustained emission reductions. Overreliance on CDR risks delaying emissions reductions and causing negative social and environmental impacts. The report analyses the climate strategies of six European nations (Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, and Norway) and the European Commission, evaluating their reliance on engineered removals, such as direct air capture with carbon storage (DACCS) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), as well as land-based sequestration.

Findings

Across the reviewed jurisdictions, CDR plans are often fragmented, lacking transparency and consolidated documentation. Projected engineered CDR volumes vary widely, with Ireland projecting 1.7 to 2.8 Mt by 2030, and the European Union projecting 114 Mt by 2050. Countries frequently conflate permanent carbon removals with fossil carbon capture and storage (CCS) and carbon capture and utilisation (CCU). Furthermore, definitions of residual emissions are underdeveloped, and comprehensive feasibility assessments evaluating resource constraints, such as sustainable biomass and renewable energy demand, are often absent. For instance, France and the EU project significant engineered removal volumes without adequately assessing the low technological readiness of these solutions. Furthermore, several countries depend on engineered removals to meet near-term targets despite technological unavailability. In terms of land-based sequestration, nations project future land sink removals while implementing policies, such as increased wood harvesting, that actively degrade these sinks. Risk-taking in land sink planning is evident, as projections systematically underestimate climate-driven threats like wildfires and droughts. Lastly, policies frequently contradict impact assessments and scientific advice, and multiple countries rely on exporting captured CO2 to limited and uncertain international storage sites in Northern Europe.

Conclusion

All reviewed jurisdictions exhibit significant shortcomings and signs of overreliance on permanent CDR and land-based net-sequestration. Land sink expectations are high, yet supporting measures are underdeveloped or absent, calling into question the credibility of climate neutrality commitments. For permanent removals, projections outpace realistic feasibility, resources, and infrastructure. By disregarding scientific advice and failing to address the constraints of international CO2 storage, current climate plans risk deferring necessary emission reductions and exacerbating the climate crisis.

Recommendations

To reform CDR governance, jurisdictions must establish separate, binding targets for permanent removals to avoid conflation with emission reductions. Projections must be grounded in detailed feasibility assessments that evaluate biomass, energy, and storage demands. Furthermore, countries must transparently coordinate to address international CO2 storage bottlenecks. CDR strategies should be consolidated into publicly available documents, and residual emissions must be defined transparently with public consultation. Finally, the land sink must be restored through binding policy actions that align with climate commitments and account for climate-driven risks.

Methodology annex

The comparative analysis evaluated countries based on their disclosed reliance on CDR, strategy transparency, and feasibility indicators. Evidence was collected from national climate planning documents, scientific advisory board publications, and transparency requests that yielded more than 70 background documents. Jurisdictions were assessed against fourteen themes across target setting, implementation plans, and constraints and risks.