Introduction

This report analyses the structure and evolution of the global corporate ownership network between 2007 and 2012, with a focus on identifying how ownership concentration and control have shifted following the global financial crisis. Using data from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database, it examines millions of firms and their shareholding connections to reveal how power is distributed and exercised within the global economy. The authors introduce an Influence Index to measure the control that shareholders, particularly institutional investors, exert through direct and indirect ownership links.

Ownership, the influence index, and the bow-tie topology

The report defines a quantitative framework for studying corporate control through network theory. The Influence Index captures how ownership stakes translate into control across multiple layers of investment. Firms and investors are categorised within a bow-tie topology—a structure divided into an “in-section” (IN), a “strongly connected core” (SCC), and an “out-section” (OUT). The SCC contains firms that both own and are owned by others within the same cluster, representing the nexus of global corporate control.

In 2012, the largest connected component (LCC) included approximately 70,952 influential actors, or the top 1.2 per cent of firms in the dataset. The analysis shows that a small subset of institutional investors dominates the SCC, acting as central hubs in the ownership network. These include major asset management and financial services groups that hold cross-sectoral stakes across global markets.

Evolution of the network and power structures

Between 2007 and 2012, the composition and concentration of ownership evolved in response to financial instability. The global financial crisis led to an initial disruption of the network, particularly within the SCC and the super-entity of most influential firms. However, by 2012, the structure showed a high degree of resilience and consolidation.

The study finds that while the number of firms in the IN-section increased, the SCC became more concentrated, suggesting that control was centralised among fewer, larger financial actors. The consolidation of ownership in institutional investors—especially large passive fund managers such as BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street—indicates a trend towards the emergence of a stable yet highly centralised system of economic power.

Quantitatively, the core maintained approximately 25 per cent of total network influence despite external shocks. This persistence highlights a structural robustness that limits market fragmentation but increases systemic interdependence.

The power structures

Network visualisations of 2007 and 2012 demonstrate the spatial concentration of influence in the SCC and inner core. In 2007, financial firms were already dominant within the network, but by 2012, the concentration of influence had intensified further. The analysis shows that the majority of influential actors belong to financial sectors—banks, insurance firms, and institutional investors—while industrial and government entities play secondary roles.

The report also identifies geographic clustering, with Anglo-Saxon economies (such as the United States and the United Kingdom) and EU-28 nations forming the central nodes of control. Emerging markets, represented by BRICS countries, occupy more peripheral positions in the ownership network.

Zooming into the main network structure

The report zooms into the LCC to highlight interconnections among influential firms. It reveals that the network’s resilience stems from its densely connected core, where ownership links among large asset managers create mutual dependencies. Only about 5 per cent of ownership links connect firms outside this core, demonstrating that global corporate control is highly interconnected and tightly bound.

The findings suggest that this concentration of influence contributes to market stability during crises but also raises concerns about systemic risk and reduced market competition. A few central entities wield disproportionate power, influencing corporate governance and investment flows across multiple sectors and regions.

Conclusion

The study concludes that global corporate ownership has become increasingly centralised within a small “super-entity” of financial institutions. While this configuration enhances resilience to external shocks, it simultaneously amplifies systemic risk and interdependence across markets. The authors note that such concentration may affect market fairness, corporate accountability, and the effectiveness of regulatory oversight.

This analysis highlights the need for continued monitoring of ownership concentration, particularly among passive institutional investors. Transparency in corporate control structures and cross-border ownership is recommended to mitigate systemic vulnerabilities and ensure balanced economic governance.