Value-up initiatives as a strategy for corporate governance and capital market development: Lessons from Asia
This report analyses Asian “value-up initiatives” designed to address persistent valuation discounts. Through case studies of Japan, Korea, and Singapore, it evaluates how these programmes use disclosure and reputational pressure to improve capital allocation. While enhancing transparency, they serve as complements to, not substitutes for, fundamental investor protection.
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OVERVIEW
Introduction
Asia has emerged as a major force in the global economy, accounting for approximately 31% of global GDP and 56% of the world’s listed companies in 2025. However, nearly 40% of Asian listed companies trade below book value. In some jurisdictions, such as Korea, these persistent low market values are referred to as the “Korea discount”. This report examines the rise of “value-up initiatives” across several Asian jurisdictions, including Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Mainland China, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia, designed to improve corporate valuations and strengthen capital markets.
Strategies for the development of capital markets and the rise of value-up initiatives in Asia
Recent reforms across the region show that many countries are moving beyond single interventions to multi-faceted strategies. These include improving market access, developing institutional-investor bases, and strengthening corporate governance. For instance, Singapore established the Equities Market Review Group in 2024 to address both demand and supply sides of its equity market. Japan’s 2023 value-up initiative followed over a decade of reforms to stewardship and market structure, illustrating that value-up programmes often sit within a longer reform process.
Drivers of value-up initiatives in Asia
The primary driver is the persistence of low valuations. In Korea, Hong Kong, and Japan, many companies trade below book value despite strong operating performance. Institutional factors contribute to these discounts. Corporate ownership is often concentrated; the three largest shareholders hold more than half of the equity in approximately 52% of Asian listed companies, compared with 44% globally. Additionally, dividend payout ratios are comparatively modest at 37% in Asia versus 41% globally, while cash holdings represent about 16% of assets compared with 14% globally. Institutional investor participation is also lower, holding approximately 21% of Asian listed equity compared with 47% globally.
Implementation of value-up initiatives: Country case studies
Japan: Following the “Ito Review” in 2014, which recommended a minimum return on equity (ROE) of 8%, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) issued a request in March 2023 for companies to implement management conscious of cost of capital and stock price. By February 2026, 93% of Prime Market companies had disclosed information in response. The share of Prime Market companies with a price-to-book ratio (PBR) below 1.0 fell from roughly 50% to 27% between July 2022 and March 2026.
Korea: The Corporate Value-up Programme launched in February 2024. While formally voluntary, it includes incentives such as the Korea Value-up Index and tax benefits for shareholders of high-dividend companies from 2026. Korea also introduced public identification for persistently low-PBR companies. In 2025, the KOSPI rose by 75.6%, though this was heavily influenced by a boom in the semiconductor and AI sectors.
Malaysia: Building on the 2022 Public Listed Companies Transformation (PLCT) Programme, the “MY Value Up” initiative was launched in 2026, targeting 88 issuers representing 80% of Bursa Malaysia’s market capitalisation. It focuses on board-led strategies for capital allocation and investor engagement.
Taiwan and Mainland China: Taiwan’s “Power Up” programme saw 487 listed companies (approximately 46% of all firms) disclose enhancement plans by December 2025. Mainland China introduced more prescriptive requirements in November 2024, particularly for companies in major indices or those trading below book value for prolonged periods.
Thailand and Singapore: Thailand introduced JUMP+ in 2025, with 142 companies participating by September 2026. Singapore launched the “Value Unlock Programme” in November 2025, providing S$30 million in grants to help companies improve capabilities. Mandatory disclosure requirements for dividend policies and investor relations will take effect in Singapore from 1 January 2027.
Similarities and divergences in the design of value-up initiatives
While jurisdictions differ on regulatory compulsion—with China being more prescriptive and others like Japan and Malaysia relying on voluntary participation—all share a focus on value creation. Programmes typically require boards to re-examine financial policies and disclose concrete plans to the market. A common feature is the prominent role of stock exchanges, which act as governance institutions by facilitating comparison and attaching reputational consequences to participation.
Early evidence and the challenge of assessing effectiveness
Assessing effectiveness is difficult due to macroeconomic variables. While equity indices in Japan and Korea recorded substantial gains, Malaysia saw weaker performance. PBR trends are mixed: China saw early increases, while median valuations in Korea and Taiwan declined despite strong index performance. However, investor participation has increased; Japan saw a 50% rise in assets managed by equity funds over three years, and announced share repurchases grew significantly in both Japan and Taiwan.
Policy lessons and limitations
Value-up initiatives serve as a corporate governance strategy by encouraging boards to rethink investment and financing policies. They function as signalling mechanisms that attract investor attention to undervalued stocks. However, they have clear limits. They cannot substitute for fundamental investor protections against related-party transactions, nor can they manufacture growth opportunities for companies in declining industries. There is also a risk of encouraging “financial engineering” or becoming a mere “compliance exercise” if investors and analysts do not actively engage with the disclosed information.