Beyond the blame game: Why the proxy system needs to change
This report examines the global proxy voting system, arguing that current costs exceed benefits. It analyses the economic and legal value of votes, finding significant misalignment between companies and investors. It proposes various solutions, including AI-driven triage and rewarding voting participation, to improve long-term value creation.
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OVERVIEW
Executive summary
The global system of proxy voting is undergoing a significant shift as corporate and investment executives move from frustration with proxy advisers to addressing systemic issues. The current proxy system frequently incurs costs that exceed its benefits, detracting from long-term dialogue between investors and corporations. Data indicates that 7.4% of all ballot items covered by ISS between 2005 and 2024 were non-voting. While companies often assume investors care equally about every vote, investors frequently view votes as non-additive to long-term performance, triaging strategic items and commoditising immaterial ones.
Reforming the proxy voting system: the time is now
There is an urgent need to improve the proxy voting system to support effective capital allocation. Current developments suggest that misalignment between principals and agents in capital markets remains high. Global companies and investment organisations have the opportunity to drive change by making sense of the status quo and exploring solutions for healthier alignment focused on long-term value creation.
What is a proxy vote worth?
The research finds little empirical evidence that every proxy vote holds permanent value. Market signals for detecting value are currently opaque, with little evidence of attribution linking voting to alpha generation. Legally, while the landmark 1988 Avon letter linked fiduciary duty to proxy voting for ERISA plans, the ‘Prudent Man’ principle allows investors to monitor the cost of implementing votes. When the cost of voting exceeds the benefit, investors may choose not to vote.
The infrastructure for casting votes, often called ‘the plumbing’, is a source of frustration due to a complex maze of data exchange channels. ‘Leaks’ in this pipeline mean investors cannot always be certain their votes are weighted correctly, and companies cannot determine the precise level of investor support. This problem is greatest when the stakes are highest, such as during contested votes or corporate transactions.
Which votes matter most?
Empirical data suggests that director elections are viewed as the most important decisions, yet they represent a shrinking share of total voting over the past twenty years. In 2024, directors received 91.2% support on average, with only 481 directors out of 23,251 (2%) failing to receive majority support. Proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass-Lewis dominate the market with estimated shares of 47 percent and 37 percent respectively. These firms often influence voting levels; for instance, 23 percent of ISS clients and 9 percent of Glass Lewis clients followed ‘no’ recommendations as of 2021.
Information asymmetry is also present where voting levels remain undisclosed. Management may choose not to disclose unfavourable voting levels, making them feel more vulnerable than investors expect. Furthermore, the spectrum of engagement varies widely; institutional investors cast 77.8% of eligible votes in 2024, down nearly seven percentage points from 2020, while retail investors voted only 29.8% of their shares.
Is it all about costs?
The system is widely decried as inefficient and is often described as the link in the investment value chain that technology forgot. While technology and AI could play a role in lowering costs, they require significant upfront investment. Proxy advisory firms currently collate vast amounts of information, but executives do not yet see AI as being able to ‘make recommendations, period.’
Potential solutions – where do we go from here?
To minimise costs, the report recommends using AI/technology for triage and reducing annual proxy votes to focus primarily on director elections. It also suggests clarifying that investors have the option, rather than the obligation, to vote, allowing them to vote with company recommendations by default unless they opt out. Organisations should ‘not run up the score’ by seeking support far in excess of the 50%+1 required. Raising the standard for shareholder proposals by reserving the right for long-term strategic shareholders could also reduce ballot volume.
To maximise value, companies could explicitly reward investors for casting votes through warrant-like mechanisms. Other suggestions include creating a formal market for votes, using call option-like mechanisms for voting shares, and encouraging asset owners to incentivise asset managers for voting in their mandates. Large investors could share their voting intentions in an open-source manner to provide guidance to others. Additionally, providing a rationale for votes against management and engaging before voting could increase information value. Finally, companies should release ballots earlier; currently, for 88% of shareholder votes, investors are unable to find out the questions in time to decide on lending or voting.
Next steps
A well-functioning proxy voting system is critical for capital allocation. Analysis will continue to develop practical tools that have a systemic, global impact. Global companies and investment organisations can change the system by helping to develop alternatives that lead to a stronger, long-term-focused framework.