Adaptation and resilience finance in an overshoot world: The Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2026: adaptation deep dive
This Climate Policy Initiative report analyses global adaptation finance, which reached USD 69 billion in 2024. It highlights that funding for developing regions is increasing but remains insufficient for the most vulnerable nations. The authors propose five key questions to redefine progress and build resilience during climate overshoot.
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OVERVIEW
Executive summary
Global average temperatures are projected to exceed 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels in the near future, leading the world into a period of climate overshoot. This context necessitates a long-term perspective in economic decision-making, as assets built today must withstand increasingly severe summers, heavier rainfall, and volatile risks. In 2026, events such as flash floods in Nepal, wildfires in Indonesia, and European heatwaves have highlighted the immediate severity of these hazards. The current pattern of finance remains far from building sufficient resilience. This report seeks to examine the current status of adaptation finance and redefine how progress is measured during this era of intensifying climate risk.
Introduction
Adaptation relates to the ability of people and essential systems—including agriculture, energy, and health—to adjust to a changing climate. Progress is commonly assessed by the quantity of finance committed, influenced by the COP30 call to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035. However, measuring adaptation is more complex than mitigation because an activity’s resilience-building potential is highly dependent on specific local risks and contexts. Current tracking methodologies, such as the MDB–IDFC Common Principles, often vary in how they attribute costs to adaptation, making direct comparisons difficult. Primary financial flows are currently captured well for international public finance, but significant data gaps remain for domestic public spending and private investment.
The current state of adaptation finance
Tracked global adaptation finance reached USD 69 billion in 2024, representing a compound annual growth rate of approximately 7% since 2019. Despite this growth, annual flows have fluctuated, and the 2024 figure remains below the 2022 peak of USD 82 billion, which was driven by exceptional Chinese public finance and COVID-19 recovery spending. International sources provided 61% of global tracked flows and at least 90% in developing regions. Sub-Saharan Africa became the largest recipient region in 2024, with flows nearly doubling to USD 13.9 billion since 2019. In contrast, China recorded a decline of 7% over the same period.
Sectoral analysis shows that water and wastewater remains the largest recipient of finance, accounting for USD 22.8 billion (33%) in 2024. Significant growth was observed in sectors with long-lived assets; transport finance more than tripled to USD 6.7 billion, and energy systems tripled to USD 1.5 billion. However, finance for the most vulnerable nations remains limited. The ten most vulnerable countries each received less than USD 160 million in 2024, representing 0.2% or less of the global total. Furthermore, the share of finance reaching Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) has barely moved, with LDCs accounting for 18% of the total in 2024.
Non-concessional public debt remains the dominant instrument, rising to USD 44 billion in 2024. While concessionality generally aligns with debt vulnerability—countries in debt distress received 73% of finance as grants—some high-risk countries still rely on non-concessional loans. Innovative instruments, such as the 2024 Barbados debt-for-climate-resilience swap, offer alternative paths by generating fiscal savings—USD 125 million in the case of Barbados—to support water and food security without increasing debt service burdens.
Redefining progress in an overshoot world
Tracking financial volume alone describes only a fraction of what determines resilience. Most capital that builds resilience is committed for other purposes, such as infrastructure development, without being labelled as adaptation. For instance, a 2022 assessment found that for every USD 1 invested in resilient infrastructure, USD 87 was directed to infrastructure that did not integrate resilience principles. To address this, the report proposes five questions to assess progress: institutional embedding of climate risk, the effectiveness of risk-sharing, the extent of resilience in broader investment, the flexibility of finance to adjust to warming pathways, and the delivery of durable outcomes.
Evidence of progress is already present within various organisations. Singapore is conducting site-specific coastal risk studies to inform legislation, while AT&T uses downscaled projections to prioritise network hardening. Financial institutions like Banco Davivienda have geocoded loan books against hazard maps to identify lending opportunities. Moving forward, the tracking community must work to surface and connect these internal indicators, focusing on the quality and design of interventions rather than just the volume of finance committed.
Conclusion
While tracking the volume of adaptation finance is foundational, it currently shows that capital is not moving fast enough toward the countries facing the greatest risks. Much of the infrastructure being financed this decade, such as hospitals and power grids, will still be operational in 2050 during the peak of temperature overshoot. Modest upfront investments in resilience can substantially reduce expected losses. The central challenge remains whether the world can move beyond simply measuring how much was spent to understanding whether communities and economies are actually better prepared for the climate impacts ahead.