Conflicting objectives of ESG funds: Evidence from proxy voting
This study examines whether ESG funds prioritise short-term financial performance over long-term sustainability. It finds that ESG funds frequently oppose environmental and social proposals during close votes or at firms with low sustainability scores. Because investors rarely monitor voting records, funds can prioritise returns without facing capital withdrawals.
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OVERVIEW
Introduction
Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) funds have experienced record capital inflows, highlighting the significant role asset managers play in addressing corporate sustainability through voting decisions. However, concerns persist that these funds may deviate from their stated investment objectives. ESG funds face a dual mandate: they must market themselves as pro-sustainability vehicles while fulfilling a fiduciary duty to maximise investor wealth. This paper investigates whether financial incentives drive ESG funds’ voting behaviour on environmental and social (E&S) issues and whether fund investors internalise the costs associated with these decisions.
Data and descriptive statistics
The study examines E&S shareholder proposals for Russell 3000 firms between July 2010 and June 2021. Using data from ISS Voting Analytics and the CRSP Mutual Fund database, the researchers manually classified 2,089 E&S proposals into categories such as climate change, diversity, and political contributions. Of these proposals, 70% were social-related, with political contributions forming the largest subgroup. Descriptive statistics reveal an “opposition gap”: while ESG funds generally support E&S proposals more than non-ESG funds, they still oppose them 37.8% of the time, compared to 63.7% for non-ESG funds. Notably, ESG funds oppose E&S proposals 2.3 percentage points more frequently than recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).
Voting behaviour of ESG funds
Empirical analysis shows that ESG funds are 13.6 percentage points less likely than non-ESG funds within the same family to vote against an E&S proposal. However, this support is conditional. The study identifies significant “window dressing” behaviour; ESG funds are more likely to vote in favour of proposals when they believe their vote will not be pivotal. Conversely, when a vote is close (within a 10% margin of the passing threshold), ESG funds increase their probability of opposition by 13 percentage points, effectively closing the opposition gap with non-ESG funds to just 1.9 percentage points. This suggests that funds prioritise financial returns when E&S measures are likely to be implemented and incur costs.
Incentives to vote against E&S proposals
The research explores why funds might oppose sustainability measures. By measuring abnormal returns on the day of the vote, the authors find that the passage of marginal E&S proposals is associated with 1.06 to 1.14 percentage-point lower abnormal returns. This evidence implies that the average investor views the implementation of these specific shareholder proposals as costly. Consequently, ESG funds face a direct trade-off between their sustainability mandates and the immediate financial performance of their portfolio firms.
Conflicting objectives: heterogeneity in voting on E&S proposals
The tension between objectives varies across fund types. Active ESG funds, which have explicit incentives to outperform benchmarks, are significantly more likely to oppose E&S proposals than passive ESG funds. Furthermore, opposition is more pronounced at firms with low ESG scores. In such cases, the perceived adverse impact of E&S improvements on financial returns is likely greater, leading funds to protect short-term performance. Within fund families, the “Big Three” institutional investors—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street—show a larger wedge in voting against E&S proposals between their ESG and non-ESG offerings, although they do not drive the overall sample results.
Muted flow-vote relationship
An important finding is that investors in ESG funds do not appear to punish funds for voting against sustainability measures. There is little evidence that capital is withdrawn following the disclosure of negative E&S votes. This insensitivity of flows to voting records suggests that monitoring costs for investors are high, or that investors are unaware of how funds exercise their voice. This lack of market discipline enables ESG funds to continue engaging in differential voting that may contradict their stated mandates.
Implications for newly proposed regulation
The study has direct implications for regulatory debates. Recent proposals by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) aimed at enhancing the reporting of proxy votes and ESG investment practices could reduce monitoring costs for investors. By promoting transparency, these regulations may better align the incentives of ESG funds with those of their clients, potentially reducing the frequency of strategic voting that hampers corporate sustainability improvements.
Conclusion
The research concludes that the conflicting objectives of achieving superior financial returns while advancing sustainability can impede genuine progress in corporate E&S policies. ESG funds appear to “walk the talk” only when the financial stakes are low, becoming pickier when their votes are pivotal. Addressing these agency frictions is essential for the efficacy of socially responsible investing as a tool for corporate change.