Shareholder activism, takeovers, and managerial discipline
This research assesses the interaction between shareholder activism and takeovers. It finds that activism reduces agency frictions but crowds out some M&A by improving internal discipline. While activist returns rely on information advantages, the threat of intervention significantly enhances shareholder value through improved managerial incentives and productivity.
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OVERVIEW
Abstract
This research quantitatively assesses the role of activism within the market for corporate control by estimating a model that incorporates both activism and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The study finds that activism serves as a complement to M&A by reducing agency frictions but simultaneously acts as a substitute, crowding out some M&A activity by providing internal disciplinary mechanisms. Activists are found to possess a significant information advantage, which is essential to overcoming the free-rider problem inherent in activist interventions.
Introduction
Management and boards may fail to maximise firm value due to misaligned incentives. While these agency conflicts are costly to shareholders, they present opportunities for outsiders to intervene and capture surplus. Both corporate takeovers and shareholder activism are prominent mechanisms for overcoming these conflicts. The paper investigates whether these interventions are substitutes or complements, noting that activism can facilitate takeovers by acting as a negotiator or providing a credible threat, but may also crowd out M&A activity if it serves as a substitutable disciplinary mechanism.
Model
The developed structural model features a firm, a manager, a board of directors, a potential activist investor, and a potential acquirer. The production technology assumes that profits are generated based on productivity, with capital choices being static. The model incorporates the manager’s effort choice, where undertaking value-enhancing projects involves a private cost. The board decides whether to retain or replace the manager, a process influenced by entrenchment costs. Shareholder value is defined as the expected discounted value of cash flows based on public information, including the potential for takeover surpluses and management improvements.
Data
The sample covers U.S. public firms from 2001 to 2019. Financial data is sourced from the CRSP/Compustat database, excluding regulated utilities, financial firms, and non-profit organisations. M&A bid data is extracted from SDC Platinum, identifying 2,194 bids. Shareholder activism events are identified via Schedule 13D filings from Audit Analytics, totalling 2,083 campaigns. CEO turnover and compensation data are provided by the Equilar database, showing a turnover frequency of 8.5 percent per year.
Identification
The model is estimated using the simulated method of moments (SMM), matching fifteen model-simulated moments to empirical counterparts. Key parameters include a profit function curvature of 0.7, a discount rate of 5 percent, and a rental rate of capital at 20 percent. CEO compensation is set at 1.6 percent of operating income before depreciation. The activist stake is fixed at the 5 percent statutory disclosure threshold required by the SEC. Preference shocks for manager and board decisions follow a Type I extreme value distribution.
Empirical estimation results
Activist campaigns significantly reduce agency frictions to takeover, increasing the probability of a takeover by 7.7 percent. However, activism acts as a double-edged sword; while it facilitates deals, it also lowers the negotiating position of the board, resulting in bid premia that are 13.7 percent (5.2 percentage points) lower. The average campaign adds approximately 6 basis points of shareholder value through takeover facilitation, though benefits reach 15.4 percent for deals marginal to intervention. Beyond M&A, activism improves manager incentives, increasing shareholder value by 0.35 percent and firm productivity by 1.17 percent.
Model implications
Equilibrium analysis reveals that the threat of activism adds 0.33 percent to firm equity value, primarily through improved effort incentives rather than increased takeover likelihood. Activism is found to crowd out approximately 0.8 percent of total M&A volume because improved management reduces the potential surplus from takeovers. Selection effects drive 91 percent of the announcement returns for activists, with superior information about potential takeovers accounting for 76 percent of the return. Policy experiments show that increasing the costs of activist entry reduces effort incentives, productivity, and overall shareholder value.
Hedge funds, activist evolution, and golden parachutes
Hedge fund activists are found to be more effective than other activists at reducing agency frictions in turnover and takeover decisions, showing a 38.8 percent reduction in turnover frictions. The efficacy of takeover facilitation has improved over time, with intervention reducing agency frictions by 15.6 percent in the late period (2010–2019) compared to no reduction in the early period. The inclusion of severance pay (golden parachutes), estimated at 2.3 percent of profits, is found to have a negligible effect on the model’s estimation and the manager’s effort decisions.
Conclusion
The research concludes that activism and takeovers can be both complementary and substitutable. Activists generate value for target shareholders primarily through improved effort incentives rather than takeover facilitation. The presence of activists in the economy provides significant social benefits, including an increase in aggregate acquirer surplus. Furthermore, the information advantage held by activists is critical to overcoming the free-rider problem in the decision to launch a campaign, ultimately benefiting all shareholders.